Intentionality and attention: the Husserlian approach to attention in relation to intentionality and its characterization as " mention".

Abstract

The present work aims at analyzing Edmund Husserl´s account of attention (Aufmerksamkeit) considering its fundamental relation with the topics of intentionality (Intentionalität) and “cogitative meaning” (Meinen). Husserl´s definition of attention as cogitative meaning is one of the most characteristic moments of his description of this phenomenon, and it has a key importance insofar as it differentiates his analysis from psychological approaches. For this reason, the first step will be the exposition of the main concepts of the psychology of the late nineteenth century that contributed to shape Husserl´s own position. Then, we shall examine Husserl view on attention until the Logical Investigations and evaluate the contribution of the later development of the theory of intentionality to the interpretation of attention. Finally, we will reflect on the connection between the analysis of intention and the description of the orientations of attention, underlying the specific function of cogitative meaning regarding the horizonedness of experience.