Bayle and the Skeptical Decalogue

Abstract

This paper aims to show that skeptical philosophy does not only displace the evidence of reason, but also poses another kind of reason. Through a detailed study of the entry about Pyrrho and the “clarification about Pyrrhonism” in the Historical and Critical Dictionary written by Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), this paper shows that skepticism does not mean to question any law, but allows to construct a “skeptical law”, from a “skeptic Decalogue” (Sextus Empiricus’ ten tropes of the suspension of judgement): the varieties and variations of beliefs and opinions throughout different people and conditions dilute the opposition between reason and faith; on the other hand, the irrational in faith may be a criticism of reason –not of any reason, but of theological reason. With the pretext of supporting the thesis of the illness of reason and the necessary resort to revelation, Bayle lodges himself in the rhetoric of the mysteries, in order to subvert the opposition between reason and faith, and to show that, far from being irrational, the mysteries exemplify a way of thinking that is different from the usual metaphysics.