Notas sobre Spinoza y por qué no nos puede salvar de la crisis ecológica

Abstract

Spinoza’s commitment to naturalism may at first glance appear helpful for tackling the currently trending emphasis (in
political as well as scientific and philosophical discourses) on an unprecedented threat to human existence on Earth. This is so, because naturalism seems to provide Spinoza’s metaphysical philosophy with the rare (if not unique) character of being formulated from nature’s own perspective. This, in turn, seems to allow us to use it as a means for responding to, and combating, all of those human-inflicted dangers to nature which together constitute the allegedly imminent risk of ecological catastrophe. Indeed, arguments in favour of this interpretation of Spinoza’s commitment to naturalism are becoming increasingly common. In this paper, I argue that the suggestion to re-conceptualize morality based on that, or a similar, reading of Spinoza misunderstands rather than captures the radicalism of Spinoza’s commitment to naturalism. I will argue, first, that it is only possible to read Spinoza’s commitment to naturalism as giving rise to a radically ecological ethics if we make an uncharitable interpretation of his texts, and then, that this reading –if pursued anyway– will lead to an untenable position with regards to both ecology and morality seen from the perspective of Spinoza´s system of thought.